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The Market Value of Reducing Cancer Risk: 
Hedonic Housing Prices with Changing 
Information 
Ted Gayer,* James T. Hamilton,t and W. Kip Viscusi: 
In this paper, we use housing price changes occurring after the release of a regulatory agency's en- 
vironmental risk information to estimate the value people place on cancer risk reduction. Using a 
large original data set on the repeat sales of houses, matched with detailed ata on hazardous waste 
cancer risk and newspaper publicity, we find that housing prices respond in a rational manner to 
changes in information about risk. Since the new information indicated that he sites in our sample 
pose relatively low cancer risk, the informational re ease led residents to lower their isk beliefs, 
resulting in an average housing price increase of $56 to $87. This price change implies a statistical 
value per case of cancer of $4.3 million to $8.3 million, which is similar to the estimates obtained 
in labor market studies of the value of a statistical life. Newspaper publicity about the local sites 
increased housing prices, suggesting that residents perceived the news as good. 
1. Introduction 
Market evidence on the value of a statistical ife invariably consists of cross-sectional evi- 
dence on risks and prices or wages at a point in time. If information about the level of risk 
changes over time and people incorporate this information in a rational manner, there will be a 
corresponding price response. On the basis of these temporal changes, one can estimate the market 
price-risk tradeoff, eliminating many confounding time-invariant effects that cannot be controlled 
for using cross-sectional data. This paper examines the market response to the release of govern- 
ment information about the level of risk at hazardous waste sites and provides insight into the ra- 
tionality of this response. 
Studies based on experimental evidence and survey data often find that individual beliefs may 
deviate from objective risk levels.' People often overestimate highly publicized risks and mortality 
risks. In the case of hazardous waste risks, bias in risk beliefs often leads to considerable public re- 
action and pressure for site cleanups, which may be an inefficient outcome. By using market data, 
* Public Policy Institute, 3600 N Street NW, Suite 200, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20007, USA; corre- 
sponding author. 
t Sanford Institute, Box 90245, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA. 
+ Hauser 302, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. 
T.G.'s research was partially supported by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and 
a summer research grant from Georgetown University. The Harvard Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business and the 
Sheldon Seevak Research Fund supported W.K.V.'s research. Helpful comments were provided by Richard Bishop and 
Maureen Cropper at the 2000 AEA meetings, by Michael Greenstone of the University of Chicago, and by seminar partici- 
pants at the University of Maryland, the University of California at Berkeley, Georgetown University, and the U.S. Environ- 
mental Protection Agency's Office of Policy Analysis. We are also grateful for comments from two anonymous referees. 
Received February 2001; accepted February 2002. 
SContributions to this literature include Lichtenstein et al. (1978), Combs and Slovic (1979), Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), and Arrow (1982). Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) provide a summary of such studies, and Viscusi (1998) 
also reviews this literature. 
266 
The Market Value of Reducing Cancer Risk 267 
one can examine whether this intense public reaction carries over to contexts in which private 
money is at stake. 
Government agencies frequently use information provision as a regulatory device, particularly 
since the advent of the right-to-know movement of the 1980s. Examples of information provision 
efforts include the Food and Drug Administration's requirement that many prescription drugs in- 
clude information inserts, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's requirement that 
sellers of houses built before 1950 inform buyers about the presence of lead-based paints, and the 
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) requirement that manufacturing facilities report their an- 
nual releases of chemicals above a threshold amount for a list of over 600 substances. Such regula- 
tions imply a belief that citizens can learn from information about risk and rationally adjust their 
prior beliefs towards the objective risk level in light of the information. This article provides mar- 
ket evidence to bolster the results of some survey studies of information transfer that suggest that 
individuals revise their risk beliefs in response to new information.2 
The U.S. federal policy dealing with hazardous waste sites is known as the Superfund pro- 
gram. The most hazardous sites are targeted for cleanup and placed on a government priority roster 
called the National Priorities List (NPL). Extension of the classic theory of compensating differen- 
tials to the housing market implies that environmental disamenities (such as hazardous waste sites) 
will reduce housing prices (Rosen 1974). The negative impact of hazardous waste sites on the 
housing prices of nearby residences is well documented. For example, in a previous study (Gayer, 
Hamilton, and Viscusi 2000), we used an analysis that focused on the sale of 16,928 houses from 
1988 to 1993 that surround Superfund sites in Greater Grand Rapids, Michigan. We found that be- 
fore the EPA released its risk report, a reduction in the cancer risk from neighborhood Superfund 
sites by the mean level of risk would increase the average value of a house by $238 (in 1996 dol- 
lars).3 To estimate this willingness of residents to pay to avoid cancer risks before the release of 
the EPA's risk report, we assumed that residents' prior beliefs were equal to the objectively mea- 
sured risks suggested by the report. Thus, this analysis was based on the very strong informational 
assumption that residents could, in effect, predict the results of the EPA's site-specific risk assess- 
ments. Before the release of the report, the price-risk tradeoff implied a value of a statistical cancer 
case of $51 million. Once the EPA released its risk information, the implied value of a statistical 
cancer case was $4 million. These results suggest that after the release of the EPA's risk report, re- 
vealed preferences for avoiding Superfund risks were consistent with surveys of the value of a sta- 
tistical ife in the labor market. 
In this paper, we examine how residents respond to information about Superfund risks by ex- 
plicitly formulating how risk beliefs may change with the release of the EPA's site-specific infor- 
mation about risk levels. We do not assume that people know the site-specific risks before the 
release of the EPA's studies providing estimates of the cancer risk levels. Rather, we make the 
more realistic assumption that people base their estimates of site risks on their general knowledge 
2 For example, Viscusi and O'Connor (1984) find that workers act as Bayesian decision-makers when they process risk infor- 
mation about job hazards. Viscusi and Magat (1987), Viscusi, Magat, and Huber (1987), and Smith et al. (1988) also 
present evidence of risk learning. 
3 Other authors have developed estimates of the impact of all of the disamenities generated by a site and expressed this in 
terms of a dollar-distance tradeoff. For example, Kohlhase (1991) found that the marginal price of an additional mile from 
a Superfund toxic waste site in Houston was $2364 in 1985. Kiel (1995) found that the marginal price of an additional 
mile from the Wells G & H and Industri-Plex Superfund sites in Woburn, Massachusetts, was $6,468 in 1992. McClelland, 
Schulze, and Hurd (1990) found that closing the Operating Industries Inc. Superfund site in Los Angeles, California, in- 
creased the average value of a neighborhood house by $5001 in 1985 (all figures are in 1996 dollars). 
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of Superfund sites. The two reference points we use involve equating residents' prior beliefs about 
site risks with estimates of the average cancer risk level at Superfund sites nationwide and across 
the state. Once the EPA's information about the site-specific risk level is released, our model incor- 
porates this objectively estimated risk level into residents' posterior risk beliefs. 
Because our focus is on changes in risk over time, we focus on the subsample of houses sold 
more than once in the Greater Grand Rapids area from 1988 to 1993. This repeat sales methodol- 
ogy allows us to avoid some econometric problems, such as omitted-variable bias, because all 
time-invariant effects drop out of the analysis. The estimates consequently isolate whether price ef- 
fects vary over time as risk beliefs change. 
The average cancer risk for Superfund sites throughout the country and throughout the state 
is greater than the average risk for the Greater Grand Rapids sites. Consequently, if residents are 
basing their priors on their general knowledge of Superfund sites, and if they update their beliefs 
after the site-specific EPA risk data are released, then their risk beliefs will decline after the infor- 
mational release. We would then expect housing prices to increase. If news stories about sites con- 
vey information that also causes a reduction in risk beliefs, then we would expect housing prices 
to rise with newspaper coverage. We find both of these effects in the analysis of our repeat sales 
sample. When other factors are controlled for, prices for housing sales after the release of the EPA 
site-specific risk data are higher. The implied value of a statistical case of cancer is between $4.3 
and $8.3 million, depending on whether one assumes prior risk beliefs were based on national 
average risk levels or statewide average risk levels. The similarity between these values and the esti- 
mates of the value of a statistical life from other market contexts, such as that of the labor market, 
suggests that the residents react to risks from hazardous waste sites in ways that closely parallel 
their reaction to other risks. The finding that newspaper coverage increases housing values further 
suggests that the circulation of information from private sources about sites can cause people to 
lower their estimates of risk. 
Some other hedonic studies examine whether the price-distance (rather than the price-risk) 
gradient changes over time, as information changes. In contrast o our finding, Kiel (1995) found 
that the price-distance tradeoff did not diminish either after the announcement of the cleanup or 
after the beginning of the cleanup of two Superfund sites in Woburn, Massachusetts. This is not 
necessarily inconsistent with our results, since for these sites it may be the case that the new infor- 
mation conveyed by the cleanup announcement and action indicated that the risks from the sites 
were higher than the baseline perception. Michaels and Smith (1990) found a price-distance effect 
after the announcement of hazardous waste risks at a site, although their results vary by housing 
submarkets.4 
This paper improves upon our earlier study of hazardous waste risks in at least three ways: In 
the present study, we (i) explicitly model how risk beliefs may change by positing that prior be- 
liefs are based on general knowledge of hazardous waste sites rather than assuming that risk be- 
liefs do not change, (ii) use a repeat sales methodology that helps avoid omitted-variable biases in 
the hedonic analysis, and (iii) estimate the value of a statistical cancer case given various assump- 
tions of discount rates and latency periods. 
Discussions of risk policy often assume that individuals cannot accurately perceive risks or 
that they fail to update their beliefs in the face of new information. This paper provides evidence 
that individuals can reassess their beliefs of the risks at hazardous waste sites and do spend their 
4 For a thorough review of property hedonic studies involving environmental disamenities, see Farber (1998) and Boyle and 
Kiel (2000). 
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own resources to avoid these risks, reflecting tradeoffs that are similar to choices about safety and 
risk in other markets. In section 2, we describe the repeat sales model specification, which we then 
link to a risk-learning model in section 3. Our data are described in section 4, and results and con- 
clusions are provided in sections 5 and 6, respectively. 
2. The Repeat Sales Estimation Model 
The Hedonic Price Function 
The empirical framework we use to assess the effect of changes in risk levels is the hedonic 
property model, which postulates that housing prices are a function of structural, neighborhood, and 
environmental characteristics.5 The environmental characteristics of a house are the perceived envi- 
ronmental risks associated with living in the house. The price of house i sold at time t is given by 
Pricei, = f(Structurali, Neighborhoodi, Environmentit, t), (1) 
where Structurali is a vector containing the structural characteristics, Neighborhoodi is a vector of 
the neighborhood characteristics, Environmentit is the perceived environmental risk to the house- 
hold, and t indicates the year of the sale. Notice that the environmental risk belief variable is sub- 
scripted with t, indicating that it varies over time. The model assumes that the structural and 
neighborhood characteristics are unchanged for each house across sales.6 Residents have a learning 
function in which they update their prior beliefs of hazardous waste cancer risk after receiving in- 
formation about risk levels from the EPA. We describe this learning model in section 3. 
The use of the repeat sales housing method first advanced by Bailey, Muth, and Nourse 
(1963) eliminates the time-invariant house-specific effects and focuses on the time-specific effects. 
All that is required for the analysis is the time of the housing sale, the price for which the house 
was sold, and measures of the environmental risk level known at the time of each sale. As a result, 
the model focuses on the relationship between changes in risk levels and changes in housing 
price.7 
Model Specification 
The households in our sample are exposed to cancer risks arising from potential soil and 
groundwater contamination at nearby Superfund hazardous waste sites. Under the U.S. EPA's 
Superfund program, hazardous waste sites that pose the greatest risks to human health or the envi- 
ronment may be cleaned up with a combination of private and public funds (Sigman 1998). The 
5 The estimated price change given a change in a housing characteristic s likely to yield an approximate measure of the wel- 
fare effects (Bartik 1988; Palmquist 1992). 
6 The assumption of the repeat sales model is that the structural nd neighborhood characteristics are time-invariant. This is a 
reasonable assumption for our analysis, since there were no major changes in infrastructure for the housing market exam- 
ined. We dropped the observations for which there was a change in the structural characteristics (bedrooms, bathrooms, 
and lot size) between sales. If there were other changes to the houses in the sample, then there will be omitted variables. 
Even if this were the case, the estimated coefficients of the variables of interest would be unbiased if these variables were 
uncorrelated with the omitted variables. 
7 Our analysis is similar to that of Palmquist (1982), who used a repeat sales method to estimate the price effects of highway 
noise. 
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EPA has placed these sites in the Greater Grand Rapids area on its National Priority List (NPL), 
thus qualifying them for federal remediation funds. NPL sites undergo a site characterization pro- 
cess known as the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS). The RI/FS contains a 
baseline risk assessment and provides regional EPA decision makers with a quantitative assessment 
of human health risk at a site, a description of remedial action objectives, and an analysis of the al- 
ternatives proposed to reach these objectives. After evaluating an RI/FS, the EPA selects a remedial 
action and then documents the reasons for its selection in the Record of Decision (ROD). The RI/ 
FS, as well as the ROD, are made available to the public for examination. Note that the EPA's in- 
formation about risk levels can influence those who have not read the agency's study, since the in- 
formation may be disseminated through such avenues as resident discussions, realtor interactions, 
and media coverage. 
Figure 1 presents a timeline of Superfund events in the Greater Grand Rapids area. Each of 
the seven Superfund sites was placed on the NPL in the early 1980s. As shown in Figure 1, the 
RI/FS for each site was released at various dates between mid-1990 and late 1992. These release 
dates occurred within the six-year period of our housing sales.8 Our goal, then, is to use sales data 
for those houses sold more than once to estimate the effects on housing prices of the risk levels 
stemming from the RI/FS. 
We use two variables to measure the information derived from the EPA. The first, RIit, is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the house was sold after the release of the EPA's RI/FS for the 
closest Superfund site. The second information variable, Riskit, is a measure of the cancer risk level 
derived from the EPA risk information available to the public. That is, for a house sold after the 
release of the RI/FS for the closest site, Riski, is a measure of the objective cancer risk level stem- 
ming from the site (as derived from the EPA assessment released to the public). For a house sold 
before the release of the RI/FS for the closest site, Riski, is a measure of the average on-site risk 
level over all national or statewide Superfund sites, weighted by pathway dilution estimates corre- 
sponding to the house's proximity to the closest site. Thus, we assume that risk beliefs are based 
on the information about risk levels available at the time of the house's sale. The Riski, variable 
will serve as the mechanism for exploring the character of individuals' risk beliefs and learning, 
which we will discuss in the next section. 
It is useful to compare this formulation with that in our earlier study (Gayer, Hamilton, and 
Viscusi 2000), in which we assumed that respondents' prior risk beliefs coincided with actual risk 
levels both before and after the EPA study release. Using this assumption in a repeat sales analy- 
sis, the change in risk beliefs would be zero over time. Thus, in the previous paper, the price-risk 
gradient was estimated from the cross-sectional differences in risk levels, not the temporal differ- 
ences. The present study permits risk beliefs to vary over time and in fact generates results consis- 
tent with there being an updating of risk beliefs as characterized in rational learning models. 
We use the variable News, to measure the site information provided by local publicity. This 
variable is the total number of words about the neighborhood Superfund sites printed in the local 
newspaper from 1985 until the sale of the house. We also estimate various specifications to test 
whether the newspaper publicity serves as a mechanism of dissemination of the EPA risk informa- 
tion. We describe the information measures in greater detail in section 4. 
Equation 1 is a longitudinal model of housing prices that incorporates fixed and time-specific 
effects. Two problems arise when one tries to estimate this hedonic price function. The first prob- 
8 Within our repeat sales data set, 767 housing sales occurred after the last RI/FS was issued on November 15, 1992. 
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1 Neighborhood Sites Placed on NPL 1 
Folkertsma (6/16/90) Butterworth (5/27/92) 
Chem-Central (3/16/91) Spartan (11/15/92) 
83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 
i 
92 93 94 
IOrganic (7/19/91) 
Kentwood (2/15/91) H. Brown (7/9/92) 
4- EPA Releases RaIs -- 
( Housing Sales Observations 
Figure 1. Timeline of Superfund Events in Greater Grand Rapids, Michigan 
lem is that the collection of the relevant structural, neighborhood, and environmental data is 
extremely burdensome, often resulting in omitted-variable bias. The second problem arises in the 
choice of functional form. Hedonic theory does not provide guidance concerning which parametric 
model to estimate. If the parametric model is misspecified, the corresponding benefits estimator 
will be inconsistent. Most hedonic studies assume a semilog specification or a Box-Cox transfor- 
mation (Harrison and Stock 1984; Bartik and Smith 1987; Cropper, Deck, and McConnell 1988; 
Michaels and Smith 1990; Kiel and McClain 1995; Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi 2000).9 
By focusing on repeat sales of houses, we eliminate the problem of omitted-variables with 
respect to time-invariant characteristics of the house. We assume that changes in the housing price 
are in percentage terms. Because risk beliefs are based on the risk information, we can rewrite 
Equation I as follows: 
Pricei, = 
Btg(Structurali)h(Neighborhoodi)eI'RI,, 
ea2Riskt e3News, e, (2) 
where B, is a true but unknown real estate price index at the time of the sale; otl, 0t2, and ot3 are 
the parameters that give the relative changes in price given changes in the variables of interest; 
and Eit is the error term.10 We assume that 
E(,it) 
= 0 and Var(Eit) = 02. 
For the same house sold at time t', the price function is the same as Equation 2, except that 
it is subscripted with t' instead of t. When the ratio of the two prices is taken, the functions g and 
h cancel out, yielding 
=e B r eaO (RIi,, -Rlit) e2(Riski,, -Riskil) eO3 
(Newsl -Newst) e(c Ei -Eit) (3) Priceit Bt 
Taking the natural logarithm of each side of Equation (3) yields 
Priceit, In 
P 
= b,, - bt + atl(RI/,, 
- RIit,) + 02(Riskit, - Riskit) + 03 (Newst, - Newst) + uitt, (4) Priceit 
where b,, = 
InBrt, bt 
= 
InBt, 
and uitt, = Eit, - Eit. Thus, the log of the price ratio over time is a 
simple linear regression in which the explanatory variables are the changes in RI/FS status, risk 
9 In order to avoid the complications associated with choosing an inappropriate functional form, Stock (1989, 1991) propo- 
ses a nonparametric kernel regression for estimating the mean price effect of an environmental price change. 
1o The real estate price index is conflated with depreciation. Palmquist (1979) suggests a technique for distinguishing 
between price trends and depreciation. However, the estimation adjustment affects only the price index estimates, not the 
coefficients of the variables of interest. 
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level, and newspaper publicity. When there are only two sales of a house, one ratio is formed and 
E(uitt,) = 0, Var(uitt,) = 02. When a house is sold three times, two ratios are formed. While the 
means of the error terms are still zero, their covariance is equal to 02. We therefore have a prob- 
lem of error correlation among observations." 
The coefficients of interest in Equation 4 correspond to the effects of RI/FS status, risk level, 
and newspaper publicity on housing prices in the original hedonic equation (Eqn. 2). In addition to 
eliminating the time-invariant effects, the repeat sales method allows for the estimation of real estate 
price trends even though the sales frequently do not occur in subsequent years and the years of the 
sales may vary by house. Bailey, Muth, and Nourse (1963) show that estimation of the price indexes 
can be treated as a regression problem by letting xj be a dummy variable that takes the value of + 1 
if period j is the period of the final sale, -1 I if period j is the period of the initial sale, and 0 other- 
wise for each pair of transactions. The index is normalized by letting bo = 0. Equation (4) becomes 
T 
ritt, 
= bjxj + altRItt, + (2Riskitt, 
+ o3Newstt, + uitt, (5) 
j=1 
where ritt' = ln(Priceit,/Priceit), RIitt, = RIit, - RIit, Riskitt, = Riskit, - Riskit, Newstt, = Newst, - 
Newst, 
and the other variables are as described before.12 
We estimate both an ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression of Equation 5 and a generalized 
least-squares (GLS) regression that address the problem of error correlation across repeat sales ob- 
servations.13 However, in section 5 we report only the OLS results, since the point estimates and 
the standard errors are virtually identical to the GLS results. 
3. Prior Beliefs and Risk Learning 
To capture residents' perceptions of Superfund risks, we assume a learning model in which 
posterior risk beliefs are a linearly-weighted average of the risk levels obtained from the informa- 
tional sources.14 The amount of learning that takes place given the new information will depend 
on the magnitude of the prior and updated risk levels, as well as the informational weight placed 
on both of these sources of information. 
An individual's prior risk beliefs (before the release of the RI/FS for the closest site) are 
denoted by p, which has associated informational content 0po. 
The information weight, (po, is 
equivalent to observing PDo draws from a Bernoulli urn. People update their risk beliefs taking into 
account the probability q, which is implied by the new site-specific information about risk levels 
" We also relax the assumption of constant variance across repeat sales by computing standard errors under the assumption 
of heteroskedasticity. 
12 The dummy variables control for the annual price trends. The time components of RI, Risk, and News vary by day, not 
by year. The News, variable varies only by time, since it measures the amount of publicity on Superfund sites up to the 
day of the sale. Two houses sold on the exact same day will have the same value for News, (although the change in publi- 
city in the repeat sales observation will be different unless the two houses were sold twice on the same day). 
13 The GLS estimation yields efficient estimators. The variance-covariance matrix is equal to Q2K2, where Q is a known, sym- 
metric, positive definite matrix with twos on the diagonal and ones where the error terms are correlated. The GLS method 
is to find a matrix P such that P'P = K2-1. The matrix P is multiplied on both sides of the equation, and least-squares 
then yields efficient estimates. 
14 This approach is used in Viscusi's (1989) prospective reference theory model to structure biases in risk beliefs. This for- 
mulation is consistent with a rational Bayesian learning model, although other learning models may also be consistent with 
such a linear formulation. 
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obtained from the EPA's RI/FS. Other information (such as information provided by the local 
newspaper) would enter the model similarly. The risk level implied by this updating of information 
has informational content Co. Posterior cancer risk beliefs, nt, are of the form 
(p, q)= 
0q. 
(6) 
Po + ?o 
With the fraction of the total informational content associated with each information source 
denoted by 9 = Po/(Po + ?o), ? = 4o/(Po + ?o), the risk belief function is rewritten as 
n(p, q) = pp + ?q = pp + (1 - 9)q. (7) 
Therefore, given the release of the EPA's information about risk levels between the two sales of a 
house, a resident changes beliefs by posterior minus prior, which is equal to 
n - p = (9 - 1)p + (1 - 9)q. (8) 
If residents place full weight on the updating information (i.e., 9 = 0), then the change in 
beliefs is equal to the change in risk levels (q - p). For the other extreme, residents would place 
no weight on the updating information (i.e., 9 = 1), in which case the change in beliefs would 
equal zero (since the new information provided by the EPA is ignored). 
The repeat sales regression equation discussed in the previous section tests the effect of the 
change in risk levels on housing prices without specifying the weights on the informational sour- 
ces. Housing value changes in response to these changes would provide evidence that residents do 
place some weight on the site-specific information about risk levels provided by the EPA. In other 
words, if residents were ignoring the site-specific information provided by the EPA, then the 
change in risk levels would not affect beliefs, and thus there would be no effect on housing prices. 
The corresponding coefficient estimate would not be statistically different from zero. 
We cannot explicitly estimate the informational weights placed on prior and updated risk lev- 
els. However, in order to compute the tradeoff between prices and risk beliefs, we assume that full 
weight is placed on the new site-specific information, and thus the change in risk levels is equal to 
the change in risk beliefs (i.e., nc - p = q - p). 
In order to test the effect of changes in risk levels, we first must postulate how rational indi- 
viduals form their priors. In our earlier study (Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi 2000), we assumed 
that priors were equal to the objective risk measure derived from the EPA's risk report, even if the 
priors were formulated before the report. We based this assumption on the strong correlation be- 
tween the objective risk measure and the known characteristics of the sites (such as the size and 
type of the site). In this study, we base our assumption of priors on the informational environment 
at the time of the house sale. Before the release of the RI/FS for the closest site, we assume that 
residents base their priors on the available general Superfund risk information. That is, we assume 
that unbiased priors (p) are equal to the average on-site risk of sites on EPA's NPL, weighted by 
the house-specific dilution estimates. 5 Therefore, our assumption is that the residents' prior beliefs 
with regard to the on-site risks are equal to the average risk levels for all nationwide (or statewide) 
Superfund sites, since these residents have not yet received information on the specific risk levels 
of their local sites.16 
15 When the house-specific dilution estimates are used, it is assumed that before the release of RI/FS, people are aware of 
their proximity to the site (since the site is on the NPL) but are not aware of the on-site risk (since the EPA has yet to do 
a risk assessment). 
16 Although we do not report it in our results, we also estimate repeat sales equations using priors in which the average on- 
site risks are weighted uniformly (using average dilution estimates) across the population of the houses. 
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If the average national (or state) Superfund site is less risky than the Greater Grand Rapids 
sites, then the residents' priors will be below the actual risk (i.e., p < q). If the average national 
(or state) Superfund site is riskier than the Greater Grand Rapids sites, then the residents' priors 
will be too high (p > q). In each case, according to the rational learning models, once information 
on the actual risk is released, people should revise their risk beliefs toward the true risk level 
(given that the new information is not ignored, i.e., that 4 ? 0). However, the degree to which 
residents update their beliefs depends on the informational weight they place on the prior and the 
updated assessments. By assuming that residents place full weight on the new information, we can 
compute the marginal willingness to pay for reductions in risk beliefs. 
We use a standardized measure of cancer risk for both the prior risk level based on a sample 
of 150 nationwide Superfund sites and that based on a sample of 19 statewide Superfund sites, as 
well as the updated risk level for the local sites.17 These risk levels represent the additional proba- 
bility of getting cancer (relative to a baseline cancer risk) for a person living on the Superfund site. 
We convert these on-site estimates to house-specific estimates by using dilution factors that vary 
with the location of the house. We then sum over media (groundwater and soil) and exposure 
routes (dermal, ingestion, and inhalation). In this way we obtain estimates of house-specific prior 
and updated risk levels. We discuss the computation of these risk levels more fully in the next sec- 
tion. 
The average on-site lifetime cancer risk to adults from groundwater exposure for the 150 
national sites is 0.042. The average on-site cancer risk to adults from 150 sites is 0.005 from der- 
mal soil exposure, 0.002 from ingestion of soil contaminants and 6.2 x 10-5 from inhalation of 
soil contaminants. Using the subsample of 19 sites in Michigan, we find that the average on-site 
lifetime cancer risk to adults from groundwater exposure is 0.041. The average on-site cancer risk 
to adults from the 19 sites is 9.5 X 10-4 from dermal soil exposure, 1.2 X 10-4 from ingestion 
of soil contaminants and 1.8 x 10-4 from inhalation of soil contaminants. By contrast, the average 
on-site cancer risk to adults from groundwater exposure for the sites in Greater Grand Rapids is 
0.014, and the average on-site cancer risk to adults from soil exposure is 9.6 x 10-5 for dermal 
exposure, 6.0 x 10-5 for ingestion exposure, and 4.7 x 10-5 for inhalation exposure. Since the 
average national (and state) risk level is much higher than the average risk level from the Greater 
Grand Rapids sites, we expect that once the EPA releases the site-specific risk information, hous- 
ing prices will increase, since residents will lower their risk beliefs. 
Using the repeat sales method, we test whether housing prices react to the changes in risk 
levels. A negative coefficient estimate for a1 from Equation 5 would suggest that housing prices 
decline as a result of the release of an RI/FS for the closest site. On the other hand, if residents 
view the RI/FS as a sign that the site will soon be cleaned up, then one would expect a positive 
coefficient estimate for al. One would expect a negative coefficient estimate for 72, suggesting that 
housing prices decline with increases in risk levels. In interpreting this coefficient estimate, one 
should keep in mind that the changes in risk levels could be confounded with changes in residents' 
perceptions about the likelihood that the site will be cleaned up soon, although the inclusion of the 
RI/FS dummy variable partially controls for this possibility. Given that, on average, the updated 
risk level is smaller than the priors based on the national (or state) average, a negative coefficient 
17 The 150 sites were selected from the complete population of 267 nonfederal Superfund sites for which RODs were signed 
in 1991 or 1992. A subset of sites was chosen because of the cost of assembling the data and because of incomplete risk 
assessments at some sites. See appendix B of Hamilton and Viscusi (1999) for an analysis that suggests that this subsam- 
ple is representative. 
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estimate for (2 would suggest that housing prices increased on average for this housing market be- 
cause of the release of information about risk levels. The coefficient estimate for 03 could be posi- 
tive or negative, depending on whether the residents perceive the local newspaper reports as good 
or bad news. 
4. Data Description 
For our analysis, we constructed a sample of housing prices for 16,928 houses sold in the 
Greater Grand Rapids area between January 1, 1988, and December 31, 1993. Of the 16,928 house 
sales, 3702 were for houses that sold more than once. There were 1755 houses that were sold in 
two different years and 64 houses that were sold in three different years. The resulting repeat sales 
data set consists of 1883 observations.18 Thus, even when the sample is restricted to repeat sales, a 
large sample of observations is obtained. 
The Greater Grand Rapids area consists of the cities of Grand Rapids, Walker, Wyoming, 
Kentwood, and Grandville. This local market contains seven Superfund sites, and there were quan- 
titative EPA risk data for all but one of these sites.19 A local housing market with numerous 
Superfund sites enhances the analysis because there is heterogeneity of risk among the households. 
We obtained data on the dates of the house sales, the house characteristics, the sale prices, 
and the addresses from the Multiple Listing Service of the Grand Rapids Society of Realtors. We 
also used a geographic information system (GIS) to compute the longitude and latitude coordinates 
of each house and of the neighborhood Superfund sites. With the GIS, we computed the distance 
of each house to each of the neighborhood Superfund sites. These distance values were used in the 
computation of the risk levels described below, since we weighted the on-site risk assessments for 
soil exposure by EPA standards on dilution estimates that vary by distance to the site. Application 
of this distance dilution estimate to the on-site risk assessments yields house-specific risk levels of 
soil exposure. 
We use two variables to measure the risk information that households derive from the EPA. 
The first is a dummy variable, RIit, which has a value of 1 if the day of the house's sale was after 
the release of the EPA's RI/FS for the closest Superfund site and has a value of 0 otherwise. The 
other risk information variable, Riskit, measures the risk levels on the basis of information avail- 
able to the residents. If a house was sold before the release of the RI/FS for the closest site, then 
Riski, is equal to the national (or state) on-site average risk level of Superfund sites, weighted by 
the house's dilution estimates. If the house was sold after the release of the RI/FS of the closest 
site, then Riski, is equal to the on-site risk level derived from the EPA's site-specific assessment, 
also weighted by the house's dilution estimates. 
The EPA computes the on-site risk level for a chemical as the product of chemical concentra- 
tion, ingestion rate, exposure duration, exposure frequency, the inverse of body weight, the inverse 
of the averaging time, and the chemical's slope factor. The slope factor is an upper-bound estimate 
of the probability of the development of cancer per unit intake of the chemical over a lifetime. We 
weight both the on-site national (or state) average risk level and the local site-specific risk level by 
soil and groundwater dilution estimates in order to estimate the impact of the known risk level on 
1 Houses sold twice count as one observation, and houses sold three times count as two observations. Thus, the total num- 
ber of observations for the repeat sales model is 1755 + (64 x 2) = 1883. 
'9 The NPL sites used in this study are all of those for which RI/FSs were released during the relevant sample period. For 
the Spartan site there was only a qualitative analysis, which does not include residential risk estimates. 
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residents at different locations.20 We draw on EPA guidelines for the soil dilution estimates, which 
are a function of the distances to the sites (which were measured using the GIS). To estimate 
groundwater dilution, we use the GIS to map the groundwater plumes (natural underground reser- 
voirs) and to compute the proportion of houses in the Census block group residing above these 
plumes. For each block group, we use data from the U.S. Bureau of Census to determine the pro- 
portion of households that draw their water from groundwater, thus potentially exposing them to 
the cancer risk. These modifications mean that our risk level variable will not correspond exactly 
to a particular figure in the EPA reports, even though this level is based on the underlying EPA re- 
port data. Since the risk level depends on the location of the house and the timing of the sale with 
respect to the release of the information, Riski, varies over time and with each house. 
We compute our publicity measure, Newst, on the basis of press coverage in the Grand 
Rapids Press, which serves the entire Greater Grand Rapids area. We compute the News, variable 
by first determining the exact publication date of each Superfund-related article and then comput- 
ing the number of words in each article. The variable measures the exact number of words in the 
articles up until the day of the sale.21 Therefore, the change in publicity between sales is gauged 
as the number of words printed in articles between the day of the initial sale and the day of the 
next sale. This change in publicity has a unique value for each repeat sales observation unless two 
houses were twice sold on the same day.22 
Table 1 contains some descriptive statistics for the data set. The mean price of a house was 
approximately $70,500. On average, a house's price increased by about $7200 between sales. The 
mean number of words printed in the Grand Rapids Press about the Superfund sites at the time of 
the sale was approximately 13,000 (about 23 articles). Given priors based on the national on-site 
average weighted by the house's dilution estimates, the mean cancer risk level at the time of the 
initial sale was 1.23 x 10-5, and the mean change between updated risk levels and prior risk levels 
was -7.80 X 10-6. Given priors based on the state on-site average weighted by the house's dilu- 
tion estimates, the mean cancer risk level at the time of the initial sale was 4.93 x 10-6, and the 
mean change between updated risk levels and prior risk levels was -2.60 x 10-6. 
To examine the nature of the price and risk changes underlying the regression analysis, Table 
2 presents information on those houses in the data set that were sold in 1989 and then again in 
1992 (the modal repeat sales pair). The top rows indicate the changes in price, risk level, and 
news; the remaining rows indicate the houses' structural characteristics (which do not change be- 
tween sales). It is important to keep in mind that throughout this paper, changes in risk level refer 
to changes in risk known to the residents, not actual changes in risk exposure. Thus, when the 
EPA releases its risk information, the residents become aware of a different level of risk, even 
though the risk itself has not changed. As can be seen in the first column of Table 2, these houses 
increased in price by $6252 between sales and also experienced a drop in risk levels and an in- 
crease in news publicity. The second column of Table 2 shows data on the subset of houses that 
20 This methodology is similar to that used in Hamilton and Viscusi (1999) and Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi (2000). 
21 The articles in our newspaper data set begin in 1985. Since the repeat sales analysis uses changes in publicity from the 
first sale to the next sale, the starting date for the newspaper coverage is irrelevant as long as it begins by the date of the 
first house sale in the data set. 
22 To the extent that the local media disseminates the risk information provided by the EPA, the publicity measure could be 
correlated with the risk level. Almost all of the newspaper articles discuss, at least in part, both the risks and the costs as- 
sociated with the site. However, most of the articles (approximately 69%) emphasize the risk for the sites instead of the 
cost information. In our analysis, we ran separate specifications in order to test whether the coefficient estimates changed 
when the publicity measure was omitted. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Repeat Sale Houses 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Price at time of initial sale ($) 70,520 22,938 
Change in price between repeat sales ($) 7172 6774 
Cancer risk level at time of initial sale X 1 million 12.30 38.60 
(prior = national average) 
Change in cancer risk level between repeat sales X 1 million -7.80 28.52 
(prior = national average) 
Cancer risk level at time of initial sale X 1 million 4.93 22.30 
(prior = state average) 
Change in cancer risk level between repeat sales X 1 million -2.60 13.92 
(prior = state average) 
Dummy variable indicating if house was sold after the EPA's 0.31 0.46 
Remedial Investigation for the closest site (0/1) 
Change in Remedial Investigation status between repeat sales (0/1) 0.63 0.48 
No. of words printed in newspaper at time of the initial sale 12,939 8301 
No. of words printed in newspaper between repeated sales 12,667 5859 
had a RI/FS released between the two sale dates, while the third column shows data on the subset 
of houses that did not have a RI/FS released between the two sale dates. Those houses that did ex- 
perience a RI/FS had a greater reduction in risk levels based on the new information and a greater 
increase in news publicity. To the extent that the RI/FS presents good news, that risk is perceived 
as an economic bad, and that the news publicity is favorable, one would expect the houses for 
which an RI/FS was released to have experienced a greater price increase than the houses for 
which no RI/FS was released. Of course, unlike the regression analysis conducted in the next sec- 
tion, this analysis does not attempt to separate out the various information effects. Comparing the 
structural characteristics of the houses for which an RI/FS was released to those of the houses for 
which no RI/FS was released indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between 
them except with regard to the number of fireplaces. 
5. Empirical Results 
Estimation of the OLS Equations 
As mentioned earlier, the repeat sales model eliminates the time-invariant effects. In order to 
test whether controlling for time-invariant characteristics affects the results, we first estimate cross- 
sectional equations for the 3702 house sales that we later use in the repeat sales analysis. The 
dependent variable in this cross-sectional analysis is the log of price. Tables 3 and 4 present the 
cross-sectional results when risk beliefs prior to the RI/FS are based on the national average and 
when risk beliefs prior to the RI/FS are based on the state average, respectively. Data are presented 
for different specifications that vary with regard to their inclusion of housing characteristics, neigh- 
borhood characteristics, county fixed-effects dummy variables, and annual fixed-effects dummy 
variables. 
The cross-sectional results indicate that housing prices do respond to the level of risk. The co- 
efficient estimates for the risk level variable are negative and significant at the 1% level for 4 of the 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Houses Sold in 1989 and Sold Again in 1992 
Mean Changes for Houses 
Mean Change for All Houses Mean Changes for Houses for which RI/FS Was Not 
Sold in Both 1989 and 1992 for which RI/FS Was Released Released between Sales 
(N = 196) between Sales (N = 151) (N = 45) 
Change in price ($) 6252 6559 5232 
(5950) (4828) (8721) 
Change in cancer risk -9.52 -12.36 
level X 1 million (29.15) (32.71) 
(prior = national 
average) 
Change in cancer risk -2.87 -3.73 
level X 1 million (11.61) (13.12) 
(prior = state 
average) 
Change in news 14,093 14,505 12,712 
(no. of words) (2836) (2873) (2231) 
Housing characteristics 
No. of bedrooms 2.93 2.95 2.89 
(0.73) (0.74) (0.71) 
No. of bathrooms 1.5 1.53 1.40 
(0.56) (0.57) (0.52) 
No. of fireplaces 0.38 0.44 0.18 
(0.66) (0.70) (0.49) 
Basement 0.84 0.82 0.89 
(0.37) (0.38) (0.32) 
Lot size (square feet) 9176 9471 8186 
(6481) (6892) (4792) 
Garage 0.91 0.93 0.87 
(0.28) (0.26) (0.34) 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. The data are for the modal years of repeat sales. The difference in means of 
the last two columns (which represents a difference-in-difference approach) is significant at the 1% level for the change in 
risk using the state average (where the difference in risk for houses that did not have an RI/FS released is zero) and for the 
change in news, and it is significant at the 10% level for the change in risk using the national average (where the difference 
in risk for houses that did not have an RI/FS released is zero). Comparison of the housing characteristics for the last two 
columns suggests that the third column is an adequate control group, since the means are not significantly different between 
the two columns except for the number of fireplaces. 
12 specifications and are negative and significant at the 5% level for 7 specifications.23 For the 
mean housing price, the change in price given a mean change in the risk level ranges between 
$109 and $334 for the estimates in Table 3 and between $46 and $126 for the estimates in Table 
4. The coefficient estimates for newspaper publicity and for the release of an RI/FS suggest that 
these forms of information do not significantly affect prices. We now turn to the repeat sales mod- 
el in order to control for the time-invariant characteristics. 
Table 5 contains the repeat sales results for the OLS equations.24 The first column contains 
results based on the assumption that risk beliefs prior to the release of the RI/FS are based on the 
average national risk level of Superfund sites. The second column contains results based on the 
assumption that risk beliefs before the release of the RI/FS are based on the average state risk level 
23 All tests of significance reported in this paper are two-sided tests. 
24 As mentioned earlier, we do not report the GLS results, since they are virtually identical to the OLS results. 
Table 3. Cross-Sectional Regression Results for Six Specifications (I-VI) (Prior = National Average Superfund Risk) 
I II III IV V VI 
Cancer risk level -473.183*** -465.826*** -607.810*** - 197.522** -234.482** -236.230** 
(110.514) (110.447) (106.637) (97.035) (97.688) (97.676) 
Newspaper -2.37 x 10-6*** -1.30 x 10-6 8.10 x 10-7 1.87 x 10-6 2.10 x 10-6 
information (7.90 X 10-7) (2.39 X 10-6) (2.28 X 10-6) (1.95 X 10-6) (1.95 X 10-6) 
Remedial 0.009 0.028** -0.005 -0.012 -0.014 -0.011 
investigation (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Housing characteris- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
tics 
Neighborhood char- No No No Yes Yes Yes 
acteristics 
County fixed No No Yes No Yes Yes 
effects 
Annual fixed No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
effects 
R2 0.492 0.494 0.543 0.668 0.670 0.667 
Corrected standard errors are in parentheses. The number of observations for each specification is 3702, which represents 1755 houses sold twice plus 64 houses sold three times. The 
housing characteristics are the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, the number of fireplaces, whether the house has a basement, the lot size, and whether the house has a garage. 
The neighborhood characteristics are the proportion of the block group that are Black, the median household income in the block group, the proportion of the block group that are high school 
educated, the city tax rate, the distance to the central business district, the seventh grade reading test scores in the school district, the proportion of the block group under 19 years old, and the 
city crime rate. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4. Cross-Sectional Regression Resuls for Six Specifications (I-VI) (Prior = State Average Superfund Risks) 
I II I IV V VI 
Cancer risk level -437.889** -423.983** -685.408*** -252.211 -332.460** -333.050** 
183.307) (183.211) (177.850) (163.580) (165.838) (165.842) 
Newspaper -2.32 X 10-6*** -1.17 X 10-6 9.90 X 10-7 1.93 X 10-6 2.17 X 10-6 
information (7.90 X 10-7) (2.40 X 10-6) (2.29 X 10-6) (1.95 X 10-6) (1.95 X 10-6) 
Remedial 0.011 0.031** -0.001 -0.012 -0.013 -0.010 
investigation (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Housing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
characteristics 
Neighborhood char- No No No Yes Yes Yes 
acteristics 
County fixed No No Yes No Yes Yes 
effects 
Annual fixed No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
effects 
R2 0.490 0.492 0.541 0.668 0.667 0.669 
Corrected standard errors are in parentheses. The number of observations for each specification is 3702, which represents 1755 houses sold twice plus 64 houses sold three times. The 
housing characteristics are the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, the number of fireplaces, whether the house has a basement, the lot size, and whether the house has a garage. 
The neighborhood characteristics are the proportion of the block group that are Black, the median household income in the block group, the proportion of the block group that are high school 
educated, the city tax rate, the distance to the central business district, the seventh grade reading test scores in the school district, the proportion of the block group under 19 years old, and the 
city crime rate. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5. Repeat Sales Regression Results 
Prior = National Average Prior = State Average 
Variable Superfund Risk Superfund Risk 
Intercept 0.059*** 0.059*** 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Year 1989 0.055*** 0.055*** 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Year 1990 0.088*** 0.087*** 
(0.009) (0.009) 
Year 1991 0.090*** 0.090*** 
(0.014) (0.005) 
Year 1992 0.077*** 0.077*** 
(0.020) (0.020) 
Year 1993 0.077*** 0.076*** 
(0.025) (0.025) 
Change in cancer risk level -158.234** 
(prior = national average) (78.330) 
Change in cancer risk level -302.915" 
(prior = state average) (166.022) 
Change in no. of words 2.297 X 10-6** 2.328 X 10-6** 
printed about sites in newspaper (1.080 x 10-6) (1.078 x 10-6) 
Change in whether Remedial -0.009 -0.009 
Investigation has been conducted (0.007) (0.007) 
Corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Each observation represents a repeat sale of a house, and the dependent 
variable is the log of the price ratio of the scales. N = 1883. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
of Superfund sites. The standard errors reported in the regression tables are corrected for the possi- 
ble existence of heteroskedasticity. 
Sale prices rise with inflation, as expected. The annual price index estimates are positive and 
significant at the 1% level for both equations for each year.25 Our goal is to test whether the 
EPA's RI/FS and the site-specific risk levels affect residents' beliefs with regard to the hazardous 
waste risks and result in a price change. We also examine whether the local newspaper serves as a 
mechanism to disseminate information about the Superfund sites. 
The coefficient estimates indicate that housing prices respond to EPA information about risk 
levels in the expected direction. Given priors based on the national average, the mean change in 
risk levels (which involves a decrease in risk, since the updated risk level is lower than the prior 
risk level) results in a housing price increase of $87. Given priors based on the state average, the 
mean change in risk levels results in a housing price increase of approximately $56. This effect is 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level for the first specification and at the 10% level for 
the second specification, for which each test is a two-tailed test.26 
25 Note that the base year is 1988. Also note that the annual dummy variables could capture effects other than inflation, such 
as depreciation. 
26 As mentioned previously, we also estimated repeat sales equations using priors in which the average on-site risks are 
weighted uniformly (using average dilution estimates) across the population of the houses. The coefficient estimates for 
these equations also show a negative effect of risk levels on housing prices, although this effect is not statistically signifi- 
cant. This finding could indicate that people base their priors on their understanding of the distance of their houses to the 
closest site, or it could be due to the lack of heterogeneity of the independent variable of interest. 
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These coefficient estimates provide evidence that housing prices are responding to changes in 
risk. It is important to emphasize that this conclusion assumes that the risk level is not confounded 
with other effects. For example, the release of the information about risk levels could also be inter- 
preted by the residents as a sign that the EPA will soon clean up the site, and these future benefits 
of a cleanup will thus be capitalized into the housing price. The RI/FS dummy variable is included 
in an attempt to control for these confounding effects. 
If one assumes that residents fully update their beliefs with the new risk information, then the 
change in risk levels is equivalent to the change in risk beliefs (i.e., if (p = 0, then Eqn. 8 equals 
q - p). Under this assumption, one can estimate the value of a statistical cancer case by multiply- 
ing the coefficient estimates for the Risk variable by the housing price.27 The value must then be 
adjusted by dividing by the average number of people per household, since the housing price 
reflects the willingness to pay for risk reductions for each household member.28 Thus, using the 
results for priors based on the national average risks, the value of a statistical cancer case is esti- 
mated at $4.3 million. Using the results for priors based on the state average risks, the value of a 
statistical cancer case is estimated at $8.3 million. These estimates are similar to the estimates of 
the value of a statistical life found in many labor market and product market studies.29 These esti- 
mates are also similar to the $4 million postinformation estimate found in our earlier study (Gayer, 
Hamilton, and Viscusi 2000) based on cross-sectional evidence for the Grand Rapids sample, thus 
suggesting consistency between the two studies. 
We derive the estimates of the value of a statistical cancer case by using the estimated risk 
coefficients of the repeat sales analysis. It should be noted that we obtained the coefficient esti- 
mates using the objective cancer risk levels discussed earlier as our independent variables. These 
risk levels are based on EPA information, which assumes that residents are exposed to the risk for 
30 years, that future risks are not discounted, and that there is no latency period before the onset 
of cancer. One can relax these assumptions, computing a new estimate of the value of a statistical 
cancer case given different exposure periods, discount rates, and latency periods. That is, for a 
given annual risk (RiskA), the measure used in our empirical analysis is 30 x RiskA (i.e., 30 years 
of the annual risk). If, instead, one assumed an infinite stream of annual risk with a discount rate 
r and a latency period of n years, then the total risk would be 
RiskA RiskAA (1 + + + ...= RiskA (9) (1 + r) (1 + r)+' r 
Thus, if this annual stream is the accurate risk measure, then the 30-year assumption (with no 
discount rate and no latency period) yields estimates that are off by a factor of (1 + r)' "/30r.30 
One must divide the estimates for the value of a statistical cancer by this amount in order to obtain 
an estimate under the assumption of an infinite stream of risks with the given discount rate and la- 
tency period. In other words, the transformation equation is as follows: 
VOC' = VOC X 30r(1 + r)"-', (10) 
27 The value of a statistical case of cancer is computed by dividing the point estimate of the marginal willingness to pay for 
risk reduction by the level of risk reduction. For inframarginal changes, the hedonic price gradient is an upper bound of 
the willingness to pay for risk reduction. 
28 The average number of people per household in the relevant block groups is 2.573. 
29 See Viscusi (1993) for a review of labor market findings and for survey evidence on cancer valuation. 
30 Note, for example, that a 30-year stream of risks with no discount rate and no latency period is equivalent to an infinite 
stream of risks at a 3.4% discount rate with no latency period. 
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where r is the discount rate, n is the latency period, and VOC is $4.3 million given priors based 
on the nationwide average and $8.3 million given priors based on the statewide average. For 
example, the estimated value of a statistical cancer case given a 3% discount rate and a 10-year 
latency period is approximately $5.1 million based on the nationwide priors and $9.7 million based 
on the statewide priors. 
Although the results are not reported in the tables, we also estimated repeat sales equations 
with either the change in estimated soil risk levels or the change in groundwater risk levels replac- 
ing the change in overall risk levels. Distinguishing these component risks allows us to test 
whether people are willing to pay more or less for soil risk reduction with respect to groundwater 
risk reduction. The coefficient estimates for the change in risk levels by medium were significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level when priors based on the national average risks were as- 
sumed, but these estimates were not significantly different from zero when priors based on the 
state average were assumed. When priors based on the national average are used, the estimated 
price-risk tradeoff implies statistical cancer case values of $4.5 million for soil risk and $8.7 mil- 
lion for groundwater risk. This finding suggests that people value groundwater risk reduction more 
than they do soil risk reduction (or that they place greater informational weight on new informa- 
tion about groundwater risk than they do on new information about soil risk). 
The estimates obtained indicate that an increase in the mean number of words printed in the 
Grand Rapids Press about the Superfund sites causes housing values to increase. Housing prices 
increase by 3% in both equations, and estimates are significant at the 5% level for both equations. 
The dollar change for the mean housing price given this change in publicity is $2052 for the first 
equation and $2080 for the second equation. This amounts to a price increase of approximately 
$89 for every article pertaining to a neighborhood Superfund site. This price increase suggests that 
residents perceive local newspaper articles about the sites as good news.31 In the cross-sectional re- 
sults reported in Tables 3 and 4, the effect of publicity on housing prices was mixed. The positive 
correlation found for the repeat sales equations implies that some time-invariant unobservable char- 
acteristics apparently are correlated with publicity, thus biasing the cross-sectional results. 
The coefficient estimates indicate a negative effect of the release of an RI/FS for the closest site 
on prices. Holding all else constant, if an RI/FS is released for the closest site, the price of a house de- 
creases by 1%. However, this effect is not significantly different from zero for either specification. 
Experimental studies sometimes indicate that people do not accurately assess technical risk in- 
formation (Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1982) and that individuals either overreact to or 
ignore new risk information.32 Contrary to these claims, our repeat sales regressions based on mar- 
ket data indicate that residents respond to the information about risk levels provided by the EPA 
and to information provided by the local newspaper. Residents lower their risk beliefs for neigh- 
borhood Superfund sites, resulting in an increase in housing prices. 
Estimation of Alternative Specifications 
For robustness, we estimate equations with each of the time-variant variables of interest, as 
well as pairs of these variables, omitted from the repeat sales equation. To the extent that the local 
31 We also estimated a model that includes the interaction of risk and news, and we found a nonstatistically significant effect 
with this model. This finding suggests that the price-news gradient does not vary given different values of risk. 
32 See, for example, Slovic (1986). Viscusi, Magat, and Huber (1987) first identified such reference risk effects. Hartman, 
Doane, and Woo (1991) also found evidence of status quo bias in consumer valuation of the reliability of residential elec- 
trical service. 
284 Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi 
newspaper reports on the information provided by the EPA, the News variable may be correlated 
with the Risk variable, resulting in a biased estimate of the effect of the risk levels when the News 
variable is excluded. Similarly, the release of an RI/FS could be correlated with the Risk variable. 
The alternative stimates capture both the direct effect of the included variable(s) of interest and 
the effect of the omitted variable(s). Table 6 contains the regression results of the variables of inter- 
est when the priors are based on the national Superfund average, and Table 7 contains the regres- 
sion results of the variables of interest when the priors are based on the state Superfund average. 
Although the results are not reported in the tables, the estimates for the annual indexes are 
positive and significant at the 1% level for each equation. The coefficient estimates for the change 
in the risk level are negative and significant for all of the pertinent specifications. The coefficient 
estimate for the change in News is significant at the 5% or the 10% level when a measure of the 
change in the risk level is not included in the regression, and it is significant at the 10% level 
when the change in the risk level is included in the regression. The slight change in the News coef- 
ficient estimate when the change in risk is removed from the equation suggests that there is a small 
correlation between newspaper coverage and risk. Nonetheless, overall, the estimation results are 
stable across specifications. As shown in Table 5, the coefficient estimate for the change in RI/FS 
status is not significantly different from zero for any of the specifications, suggesting that the 
exclusion of this variable does not bias the results of the effect of risk information on price. These 
results thus offer further evidence that people lower their risk beliefs after the EPA releases site- 
specific risk information, resulting in increased housing prices. 
We also conducted a test of whether the repeat sales results of this paper are consistent with 
the full-sample results obtained in our earlier study (Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi 2000). In the 
previous paper, we assumed that the log of prices was a function of (among other things) the RI/ 
FS status, the objective risk level, and an interaction of the risk and the RI/FS status. However, 
since we did not explicitly formulate prior and updated risk levels (as we do in this paper), the 
objective risk level was the same whether or not the RI/FS had been released yet. As a check on 
the repeat sales model, we reestimated Equation 5, adapting the specification of our previous paper 
to the repeat sales framework and using the assumption of equal prior and updated risk levels. As 
in our earlier study (Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi 2000), the risk measure we use for this equation 
is the aggregate of all of the risks from the local sites. The new equation is as follows: 
T 
ri,,, = bjxj + olRIit + o2(Riski - Riski) + o3[(RIi,, XRiski) - (Rli,XRiski)] 
j= 1 
+ o4Newstt' + uitt' 
T 
= 3 byxy + I RIt,, + 13Riski(RI;,, - RIit) + o4Newst,,t + uitt'. (5') 
j=1 
Since taking differences in the repeat sales method eliminates time-invariant effects, the risk 
variable drops out, and the equation cannot estimate the price-risk tradeoff before and after the 
release of the RI/FS. Nevertheless, the equation does test whether the change in price resulting 
from the release of the RI/FS varies with respect to the level of risk. Table 8 shows the results of 
this robustness check. These results suggest that the release of the RI/FS does reduce price (though 
not significantly), and that the price reduction is smaller for higher-risk houses. When evaluations 
are carried out for the mean risk level and the mean housing price, the results suggest that the re- 
lease of the RI/FS decreases a house's price by $612. In our earlier study (Gayer, Hamilton, and 
Table 6. Alternative Specifications (Prior = National Average) 
Variable I(b) I(c) I(d) I(e) I(f) I(g) 
Change in cancer - 146.998* - 158.793** - 140.846" 
risk level (77.864) (78.576) (77.532) 
Change in no. of 2.005 X 10-6* 2.304 X 10-6** 1.927 X 10-6* 
words printed (1.096 x 10-6) (1.083 x 10-6) (1.078 x 10-6) 
about sites in 
newspaper 
Change in whether -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 
Remedial Inves- (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
tigation has been 
conducted 
Corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Each observation represents a repeat sale of a house, and the dependent variable is the log of the price ratio of the sales. Each column repre- 
sents an alternative specification of the repeat sales model. Although not reported in this table, these equations include the other variables listed in Table 4. N = 1883. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 7. Alternative Specifications (Prior = State Average) 
Variable II(b) II(c) II(d) II(e) II(f) II(g) 
Change in cancer -282.857* -298.695* -274.613" 
risk level (163.965) (168.355) (160.091) 
Change in no. of 2.005 x 10-6* 2.304 x 10-6** 1.974 x 10-6* 
words printed (1.081 x 10-6) (1.083 x 10-6) (1.077 10-6) 
about sites in 
newspaper 
Change in whether -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 
Remedial Inves- (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
tigation has been 
conducted 
Corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Each observation represents a repeat sale of a house, and the dependent variable is the log of the price ratio of the sales. Each column repre- 
sents an alternative specification of the repeat sales model. Although not reported in this table, these equations include the other variables listed in Table 4. N = 1883. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
"3 
=sl 
u 
F~ 
ch ^c. 
`;1 
a 
ch 
o 
C, 
3rj 
ch 
cs 
;s 
Ou3 
rj 
=S 
c~ 
cg 
"r 
3rJ N, 
h) 
00 
286 Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi 
Table 8. Robustness Check of Repeat Sales Regression Results 
Variable I 
Intercept 0.059*** 
(0.006) 
Year 1989 0.055*** 
(0.006) 
Year 1990 0.087*** 
(0.009) 
Year 1991 0.090*** 
(0.014) 
Year 1992 0.077*** 
(0.020) 
Year 1993 0.076*** 
(0.025) 
Change in whether Remedial Investigation has been conducted -0.009 
(0.007) 
Risk X change in whether Remedial Investigation has been 15.792** 
conducted (8.065) 
Change in no. of words printed about sites in newspaper 2.345 X 10-6** 
(1.078 x 10-6) 
Corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Each observation represents a repeat sale of a house, and the dependent 
variable is the log of the price ratio of the sales. The risk measure used in the interaction independent variable is constant 
over time (as in Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi 2000). N = 1883. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Viscusi 2000) the price reduction was estimated at $670.33 The similarity between these two re- 
sults suggests that these two papers are consistent with each other. 
We offer one final comparison with our previous paper as a consistency test. For this test, 
we estimated the cross-sectional equation of the previous paper using the full sample of 16,928 
observations and substituting in the explicitly formulated prior and updated risk levels used in the 
current paper. Given priors based on the national average, the estimated postinformation price-risk 
gradient was - 151. Evaluated at the mean price, this implies a value for a statistical case of can- 
cer of $4.3 million. Given priors based on the state average, the estimated postinformation price- 
risk gradient was -149. Evaluated at the mean price, this implies a value for a statistical case of 
cancer of $4.3 million. These estimates are very similar to the $4 million estimate obtained in 
our earlier study (Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi 2000), again suggesting consistency between the 
two papers. 
6. Conclusion 
The emergence of right-to-know legislation (such as the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-To-Know Act of 1986, the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, and the Food and Drug 
33 The mean risk in the sample used in Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi (2000) was almost an order of magnitude smaller than 
the mean risk used in the repeat sales sample for this paper. This may suggest that high-risk houses are more likely to sell 
repeatedly during a given period. 
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Administration Modernization Act of 1997) suggests an increased reliance on the ability of people 
to assess publicly provided information on health risks. These right-to-know policies have raised 
the issue of how much confidence policy makers should place on people's ability to think clearly 
about the risks they face. If individuals accurately process the risk information provided by the 
government, such information transfers can foster sounder risk decisions. Our analysis of the hous- 
ing price effects of EPA risk information examines risk learning based on housing market behav- 
ior, without relying on experimental or survey data. 
In order to test whether individuals respond to information about hazardous waste risk levels, 
we make plausible assumptions on how people form their beliefs before receiving site-specific risk 
information. We assume that before receiving the site-specific information from the EPA, residents 
base their initial beliefs about the cancer risk from the local Superfund sites on their general 
knowledge of the risks posed by nationwide (or statewide) Superfund sites. We further assume that 
changes in price due to information result from changes in risk beliefs and not from other con- 
founding factors. Controlling for the time-invariant housing characteristics, we find that housing 
prices do indeed respond to the level of risk. Since risk levels for the sites in Grand Rapids are, 
on average, lower than the nationwide (or statewide) average risk level, residents lower their risk 
beliefs and housing prices increase. 
Regulatory agencies such as the EPA must frequently evaluate programs that address cancer 
risks. In order to enact efficient regulations, an agency must obtain estimates of the value of such 
risk reductions. Typically, labor market studies are the source of such estimates because of the rel- 
atively greater availability of labor market risk measures. However, estimates of the value of a sta- 
tistical life obtained from a certain population of workers may not be appropriate for another 
population, such as one that includes nonworkers or children. Moreover, most labor market studies 
focus on mortality risk and must rely on survey data to evaluate willingness to pay for cancer risk 
reductions. 
In this paper, we use housing market evidence to find that residents learn from the cancer risk 
information provided by the EPA and that their reduction in risk beliefs leads to an increase in 
housing prices. The estimated price-risk tradeoff implies a value of a statistical cancer case of $4.3 
million to $8.3 million. If one assumes a 3% discount rate with a 10-year latency period for 
acquiring cancer, the tradeoff implies a value of a statistical cancer case of $5.1 million to $9.7 
million. Thus, by developing measures of house-specific cancer risk beliefs before and after the 
EPA's risk report, we provide housing market estimates of the value of a statistical cancer case that 
are highly consistent with estimates of mortality tradeoffs found in other domains (such as the 
labor market or the automobile market). Our results also suggest that residents perceive the news- 
paper coverage of the Superfund sites as good news and that this perception results in an increase 
in individual housing prices of approximately $89 per article. 
Our analysis suggests that EPA information leads residents to adjust their initial estimates of 
the risks from hazardous waste sites, resulting in a change in housing prices. These results contra- 
dict previous studies that suggest that people have either alarmist reactions or no reaction at all to 
risk information.34 We provide evidence that residents exhibit the ability to learn from information 
presented by the EPA on the specific local risks and that large gains from learning can take place 
once the public receives expert risk information. 
34 See, for example, Nisbett and Ross (1980) and Morgan et al. (1985). 
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